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CLOSING THE DOOR ON PERMANENT
INCORRIGIBILITY: JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT
PAROLE AFTER JONES V. MISSISSIPPI
Juliet Liu*
In April 2021, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Jones v. Mississippi, its
latest opinion in a line of cases addressing when, if ever, a child should be
sentenced to life in prison with no hope of parole or release. Although Jones
purported to resolve division among lower courts over the findings that a
sentencing court must make about a child defendant’s character and
prospects for reform and rehabilitation, the decision will likely lead to
further disagreement among courts.
This Note argues that although the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence has
protected children from harsh sentences, it has also opened a Pandora’s box.
By introducing the idea of permanent incorrigibility—that is, that any child
could be found to be permanently incapable of change—the Court invited
lower courts to engage in a dangerous predictive game. This Note argues
that the question of whether permanent incorrigibility is the correct standard
is the wrong debate to have. Although this Note endorses the importance of
judicial discretion in sentencing, it posits that permanent incorrigibility is
not a question of discretion because it is an impossible determination.
This Note ultimately argues that although critics of Jones are correct to
condemn the decision for not requiring a more stringent standard, the
problem began much earlier with the introduction of the permanent
incorrigibility principle. To counter the inconsistency that Jones is likely to
cause, this Note argues that the Court can—and should—issue a categorical
ban on juvenile life without parole. In the interim, this Note also proposes
two smaller fixes that states can implement.
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INTRODUCTION
On November 17, 2021, seventy-five-year-old Henry Montgomery logged
onto a Zoom meeting from the Louisiana State Penitentiary.1 Referred to as
“Angola” after the plantation on which it was built, the Louisiana State
Penitentiary is the largest maximum-security prison in the United States.2 It
is also where Montgomery had been incarcerated for the past fifty-eight
1. See Rebecca Santana, Henry Montgomery, at Center of Juvenile Life Debate, Is Free,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Nov. 17, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/crime-louisiana-montgomeryhenry-montgomery-f74f4e7351b3d72bd1ce1685279c9727 [https://perma.cc/3PAZ-7QBL].
2. See Anat Rubin, Tim Golden & Richard A. Webster, Inside the U.S.’s Largest
Maximum-Security Prison, COVID-19 Raged. Outside, Officials Called Their Fight a
Success., PROPUBLICA (June 24, 2020, 4:45 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/insidethe-uss-largest-maximum-security-prison-covid-19-raged [https://perma.cc/A3WA-CLC2].
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years.3 Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, Montgomery’s third attempt to
obtain parole took place via videoconference.4
When he was seventeen, Montgomery was convicted of murdering Charles
Hurt, a deputy sheriff in East Baton Rouge, Louisiana.5 A jury originally
sentenced Montgomery to death, but the Louisiana Supreme Court
overturned his conviction after finding that public sentiment against
Montgomery and an atmosphere of “intense passion” for Hurt had prejudiced
the trial.6 On retrial, a second jury returned a verdict of guilty without capital
punishment.7 In Louisiana, the verdict triggered a mandatory sentence of life
in prison without the possibility of parole.8
In 2016, at age sixty-nine, Montgomery appealed his sentence to the U.S.
Supreme Court.9 Four years earlier, the Court ruled in Miller v. Alabama10
that sentencing schemes that impose mandatory life without parole sentences
on individuals under eighteen are unconstitutional.11 Montgomery claimed
that Miller announced a new substantive constitutional rule because it
protected a class of defendants—those under eighteen—from a category of
punishment.12 Under the Court’s jurisprudence, substantive rules apply
retroactively.13 In his appeal, the Court decided in Montgomery’s favor.14
Acknowledging that its holding created a risk that individuals across the
country were serving sentences in violation of the U.S. Constitution, the
Court noted that states could remedy these sentences by creating
opportunities for parole.15 Around 800 people who had been sentenced to
life without parole as children16 obtained release after the Court decided
Montgomery.17

3. See Elyse Carmosino, Convicted of Murder at 17, His Case Changed
Juvenile Sentences. Louisiana Freed Him at Age 75., ADVOCATE (Nov. 17, 2021, 11:29 AM),
https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/article_8b7188a8-47b5-11ec-ac416befdfb0d59c.html [https://perma.cc/NTN4-HL8E].
4. See Santana, supra note 1.
5. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 194 (2016).
6. Id.; see also State v. Montgomery, 181 So.2d 756, 757, 761–62 (La. 1966).
7. Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 194.
8. Id.
9. See id. at 194–97.
10. 567 U.S. 460 (2012).
11. Id. at 489.
12. Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 208.
13. Id. at 206 (defining a substantive rule as one that “alters the range of conduct or the
class of persons that the law punishes” (quoting Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 353
(2004))).
14. Id. at 212.
15. Id.
16. This Note makes the decision to characterize individuals under eighteen years of age
as “children” as opposed to “juveniles” to serve as a reminder that, despite being defendants
in criminal cases, individuals facing life without parole under the age of eighteen are still
children. For a similar discussion on how “the writer’s choice of label is always purposeful,”
see Martin Guggenheim, Graham v. Florida and a Juvenile’s Right to Age-Appropriate
Sentencing, 47 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 457, 458 n.7 (2012).
17. Santana, supra note 1.
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Montgomery entered the care of the Louisiana Parole Project after taking
his first steps outside of Angola in nearly six decades.18 Andrew Hundley, a
former “juvenile lifer” and the first to obtain parole in Louisiana after the
Court decided Montgomery,19 founded the organization to support
incarcerated individuals upon their release from prison.20 Incarcerated
individuals face a host of potential challenges when they leave prison,
including serious mental health issues and post-traumatic stress disorder.21
For people who begin their sentences as children, the process of reentering
society can be even more challenging.22
Since Henry Montgomery was sentenced, juvenile life without parole
sentences have become increasingly rare due to changes at the state23 and
federal24 level. However, imposing the sentence remains lawful in about half
of states,25 and the Supreme Court has stopped short of issuing a categorical
ban.26 On April 22, 2021, the Supreme Court decided Jones v. Mississippi,27
its latest opinion addressing the constitutionality of juvenile life without
parole sentences.28 The Court granted certiorari to resolve division among
lower courts over what factual findings, if any, a judge must make before

18. Id.; see also Who We Are, LA. PAROLE PROJECT, https://www.paroleproject.org/
[https://perma.cc/L27B-KMET] (last visited Nov. 7, 2022).
19. See Grace Toohey, The “Power of Second Chances”: How this 37-Year-Old,
Once in Prison, Is Now an LSU Grad, ADVOCATE (May 10, 2019, 6:07 PM),
https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/crime_police/article_03c590ae-72a9-11e98d2b-4b78d19fcd5b.html [https://perma.cc/8ABK-H4NM].
20. What We Do: Reentry, LA. PAROLE PROJECT, https://www.paroleproject.org/propertymanager/ [https://perma.cc/3A5K-5P63] (last visited Nov. 7, 2022).
21. See Katie Rose Quandt & Alexi Jones, Research Roundup: Incarceration Can Cause
Lasting Damage to Mental Health, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (May 13, 2021),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2021/05/13/mentalhealthimpacts/
[https://perma.cc/
PRP9-4ZDY]. See generally REUBEN JONATHAN MILLER, HALFWAY HOME: RACE,
PUNISHMENT, AND THE AFTERLIFE OF MASS INCARCERATION (2021) (discussing the challenges
of reentry following a prison sentence, as well as the compounding effects of race, class, and
family status on life after release).
22. See Juvenile Lifers Highlight Prisoner Re-Entry Struggles, PITTSBURGH
POST-GAZETTE (Nov. 19, 2021, 12:00 AM), https://www.post-gazette.com/opinion/editorials/
2021/11/19/Juvenile-lifers-highlight-prisoner-re-entry-struggles/stories/202111190018
[https://perma.cc/N6WC-8S3Y].
23. A State-by-State Look at Juvenile Life Without Parole, SEATTLE TIMES (July 30, 2017,
9:26 PM), https://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/a-state-by-state-look-at-juvenile-lifewithout-parole/ [https://perma.cc/A6DF-VZAX].
24. See infra Part I.C; see also Cara H. Drinan, The Miller Revolution, 101 IOWA L. REV.
1787, 1787 (2016) (noting the way in which the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence has “limited
the extent to which juveniles may be exposed to the harshest criminal sentences”).
25. Anne Teigen, Miller v. Alabama and Juvenile Life Without Parole Laws, NAT’L CONF.
OF STATE LEGISLATURES (May 12, 2021), https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminaljustice/miller-v-alabama-and-juvenile-life-without-parole-laws.aspx
[https://perma.cc/
XC9K-RE6K].
26. See Nina Totenberg, Supreme Court Rejects Restrictions on Life Without Parole for
Juveniles, NPR (Apr. 22, 2021, 11:17 AM), https://www.npr.org/2021/04/22/989822872/
supreme-court-rejects-restrictions-on-life-without-parole-for-juveniles
[https://perma.cc/3S8T-TMQP].
27. 141 S. Ct. 1307 (2021).
28. Id. at 1313.
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imposing a sentence of life without parole on a defendant who is under
eighteen.29
In a 6–3 decision written by Justice Kavanaugh, the Court held that
sentencing courts need not make any factual finding, either explicitly or
implicitly, about a child’s character or potential for reform before imposing
a sentence of life without parole.30 A formal finding of “permanent
incorrigibility” is not required.31 According to the majority, when a judge
chooses whether to impose a sentence of life without parole, the discretionary
sentencing system is both constitutionally necessary and constitutionally
sufficient.32 A court can now satisfy constitutional requirements by stating
that it has considered the mitigating qualities of youth without elaborating on
its reasoning or analysis.33
Jones technically resolved the split among lower courts by ruling that it is
not necessary to make a finding as to a child’s potential for rehabilitation
prior to sentencing them to life without parole.34 However, Jones may
engender further inconsistency as courts that once made permanent
incorrigibility determinations adjust course.35
At first blush, Jones poses considerable difficulty for those who support
restrictions on juvenile life without parole sentences. By striking down the
permanent incorrigibility principle, Jones makes it easier for sentencing
judges to impose juvenile life without parole sentences because the

29. Id. Compare, e.g., Malvo v. Mathena, 893 F.3d 265, 274 (4th Cir. 2018) (articulating
the Miller standard as limiting life without parole sentences to “those rare juvenile offenders
whose crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility”), and Commonwealth v. Batts, 163 A.3d 410,
416 (Pa. 2017) (creating a presumption against life without parole sentences for defendants
under the age of eighteen and placing a burden on the government to prove, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the defendant is “incapable of rehabilitation” before a life without
parole sentence is available), with United States v. Sparks, 941 F.3d 748, 756 (5th Cir. 2019)
(noting that a court fulfills its obligation under Miller by considering mitigating evidence of
youth, but that Miller does not require a trial court to make a specific factual finding or “quote
certain magic words” to show that the defendant is permanently corrupt), and State v. Ramos,
387 P.3d 650, 665–66 (Wash. 2017) (holding that an explicit finding of permanent corruption
is not required as a matter of federal constitutional law under Miller).
30. Jones, 141 S. Ct. at 1311.
31. Id. at 1313. This Note uses “permanently incorrigible,” “permanently irredeemable,”
and “permanently corrupt” interchangeably, as reflected in the Court’s own opinions. See, e.g.,
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 472–73, 479–80 (2012) (using “permanent incorrigibility”
and “irreparable corruption” to refer to the same principle throughout the opinion).
32. Jones, 141 S. Ct. at 1313.
33. See Andrew Cohen, Supreme Court: Let’s Make It Easier for Judges to
Send Teenagers to Die in Prison, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Apr. 27, 2021),
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/supreme-court-lets-make-iteasier-judges-send-teenagers-die-prison [https://perma.cc/EYM3-VWJ4].
34. Jones, 141 S. Ct. at 1318–19.
35. See Rachel López, SCOTUS Dodges on Human Redemption, Leaves It to
States, BLOOMBERG L. (June 11, 2021, 4:01 AM), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/
bloomberglawnews/us-law-week/X1AQPRFO000000
[https://perma.cc/86SL-96UX]
(predicting that Jones will likely render “future appeals based on the failure to consider youth,
as required by Miller, basically null”).
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mitigating qualities of youth are assumed.36 Jones also revives discussion
about the inherent difficulty, if not impossibility, of implementing the
permanent incorrigibility principle37—a problem noted by critics and
proponents of the majority opinion alike.38 But even if the permanent
incorrigibility standard is problematic because it implies the existence of a
permanently irredeemable child, some supporters of limitations on juvenile
life without parole sentences find that the principle discourages imposition
of juvenile life without parole in most cases.39
In response to the tangled web of the Court’s juvenile life without parole
jurisprudence, and in the absence of a categorical ban on the punishment, this
Note poses a simple question following Jones: what now? This Note argues
that the problem began long before Jones; that decision merely exposed an
issue inherent in the Supreme Court’s permanent incorrigibility analysis. To
support this contention, this Note analyzes whether and how courts engage
in a meaningful consideration of youth when sentencing children to life
without parole. It then summarizes emerging trends as courts apply and
interpret Jones.
Ultimately, this Note makes two arguments: one theoretical and one
practical. First, it argues that courts are not rigorously considering youth
because such a consideration is an impossible predictive exercise that is
incompatible with the Supreme Court’s own conception of the nature of
youth. The Court can and should issue a categorical ban on life without
parole sentences for people under eighteen. If the Court declines to issue a
categorical ban, this Note then suggests that courts treat Jones as a

36. See id. (noting that Jones holds that “if the sentencer had discretion to consider youth,
then it should be assumed they did”); see also Jones, 141 S. Ct. at 1319 (same).
37. See, e.g., Davis v. State, 415 P.3d 666, 679 (Wyo. 2018) (stating that “the task of
determining whether a juvenile is permanently incorrigible is difficult, if not impossible”).
38. Compare, e.g., John Pfaff, It Is Ludicrous for the Supreme Court to Say Children Are
Irredeemable, WASH. POST (Apr. 23, 2021, 3:12 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
outlook/2021/04/23/jones-mississippi-supreme-court-life-sentence/ [https://perma.cc/75U69BLW] (arguing that the debate over whether a finding of permanent incorrigibility is
necessary in Jones wrongly “presupposes that such [a finding is] possible”), David M. Shapiro
& Monet Gonnerman, To the States: Reflections on Jones v. Mississippi, 135 HARV. L. REV.
F. 67, 69 (2021) (arguing that Jones “ask[ed] for very little and receiv[ed] even less”), and
Mary Marshall, Miller v. Alabama and the Problem of Prediction, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 1633,
1635 (2019) (arguing that the “fundamental instability” of the Court’s juvenile life without
parole jurisprudence is the impossible predictive exercise of judging whether a child is
permanently irredeemable), with Transcript of Oral Argument at 15–16, Jones v. Mississippi,
141 S. Ct. 1307 (2021) (No. 18-1259), https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/
audio/2020/18-1259 [https://perma.cc/7WU9-XQJK] (click “View”) (documenting Justice
Alito’s questioning of David M. Shapiro, counsel for Jones, regarding how the permanent
incorrigibility principle takes the courts into “very deep theological and psychological
waters”), and Jones, 141 S. Ct. at 1322 (noting that determining the proper sentence for a
youth offender “raises profound questions of morality and social policy”).
39. See Jones, 141 S. Ct. at 1328 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that, if courts
were bound by the permanent incorrigibility principle, juvenile life without parole would be a
“disproportionate sentence for all but the rarest children”); see also Miller v. Alabama, 567
U.S. 460, 479 (2012) (“[W]e think appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to this
harshest possible penalty will be uncommon.”).
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constitutional floor and employ a multi-pronged approach focused on
ensuring meaningful opportunities for release after sentencing.
This Note proceeds in three parts. Part I traces the evolution of the juvenile
justice system and discusses the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence around
punishing children. Part II illustrates the paradox arising out of the Supreme
Court’s invocation of permanent incorrigibility and further explores how
courts have attempted to give meaning and shape to the consideration, both
before and after Jones. Part III first argues that a categorical ban is the
optimal solution, and, although unlikely to occur, is supported by the Court’s
precedents. Part III then proposes two practical suggestions to circumvent
the uncertainty wrought by Jones.
I. FROM CHILDREN TO DEFENDANTS: THE MAKING OF THE “JUVENILE
OFFENDER” AND JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE
AT THE SUPREME COURT
This part outlines the historical and legal backdrop of the juvenile life
without parole sentence and the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in the area.
Part I.A provides a brief overview of current trends and statistics in youth
sentencing to frame the stakes of the discussion on the future of juvenile life
without parole. Part I.B summarizes how social and legal forces throughout
U.S. history have transformed the justice system’s treatment of children who
commit crimes. Finally, Part I.C examines landmark Supreme Court cases
that shaped federal law concerning juvenile life without parole.
A. Juvenile Life Without Parole Today
The United States stands alone in the global community as the only nation
where an individual may face life in prison without parole for a crime
committed before their eighteenth birthday.40 Today, twenty-five states and
the District of Columbia have abolished life sentences without the possibility
of parole for people under eighteen, but half of the states still authorize the
sentence.41 At the beginning of 2020, 1,465 people were serving juvenile
life without parole sentences in the United States.42 Roughly two-thirds of
these offenders serve their sentences in three states: Pennsylvania, Michigan,
and Louisiana.43
Although all individuals serving juvenile life without parole sentences
committed brutal crimes as children, there is evidence that many children

40. Josh Rovner, Juvenile Life Without Parole: An Overview, SENT’G PROJECT
(May 24, 2021), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/juvenile-life-without-parole/
[https://perma.cc/H9E7-GSTU].
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. TARIKA DAFTARY-KAPUR & TINA ZOTTOLI, MONTCLAIR STATE UNIV.,
RESENTENCING OF JUVENILE LIFERS:
THE PHILADELPHIA EXPERIENCE (2020),
https://digitalcommons.montclair.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1084&context=justicestudies-facpubs [https://perma.cc/4F7E-LZJZ].
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who receive the sentence grow up in traumatic environments.44 Data
indicates that many children who are sentenced to life without parole suffer
abuse and neglect from an early age.45 Poverty, housing insecurity, and other
circumstantial factors outside the control of children often compound the
effects of that trauma.46 A 2012 survey of 1,579 individuals serving juvenile
life without parole sentences found that 79 percent regularly experienced
violence in their childhood homes.47 Additionally, 47 percent of respondents
were victims of physical abuse, with 77 percent of girls reporting sexual
abuse.48 Juvenile lifers also tend to experience housing and education
insecurity as children: 18 percent of those surveyed were not living with a
close adult relative just before their incarceration, while others reported
experiencing homelessness and group home living situations.49 Fewer than
half of those surveyed reported attending school at the time of their offense.50
Furthermore, Black youth receive life without parole sentences at higher
rates than their white, Latinx, Asian American, and Indigenous American
peers.51 A 2016 analysis of sentencing data from state departments of
corrections found that over 65 percent of individuals serving juvenile life
sentences are Black.52 In some states, for example North Carolina, nearly
90 percent of juvenile lifers are children of color.53 Controlling for the crime
committed and accounting for disparities in arrest rates, Black children are
sentenced to life without parole at almost twice the rate of white children.54
This means that racial disparities originate not at the point of arrest, but rather
with prosecutorial decision-making and the sentencing practices of courts.55

44. Rovner, supra note 40; see also ASHLEY NELLIS, SENT’G PROJECT, THE
LIVES OF JUVENILE LIFERS:
FINDINGS FROM A NATIONAL SURVEY (2012),
https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/media/publications/sentencing_project_the_lives_of_juven
ile_lifers_survey_findings_2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/75X9-R6J6].
45. NELLIS, supra note 44.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.; see also CAMPAIGN FOR FAIR SENTENCING OF YOUTH, THE TIPPING POINT: A
MAJORITY OF STATES ABANDON LIFE-WITHOUT-PAROLE SENTENCES FOR CHILDREN
(2018), https://cfsy.org/wp-content/uploads/Tipping-Point.pdf [https://perma.cc/6TQ2ZWGP] (noting that approximately 72 percent of children sentenced to life without parole
since 2012 are Black).
52. John R. Mills, Anna M. Dorn & Amelia Courtney Hritz, Juvenile Life Without Parole
in Law and Practice: Chronicling the Rapid Change Underway, 65 AM. U. L. REV. 535,
575–76, 578 (2016).
53. Id. at 579.
54. Id.
55. See id. at 578; see also Joshua Aiken, Why Do We Lock Juveniles Up for Life and
Throw Away the Key?: Race Plays a Big Part, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Sept. 15, 2016),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2016/09/15/juvenile_lwop/
[https://perma.cc/7ADF9WUR].
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Juvenile life without parole sentences are increasingly rare due to a trend
toward abolition among states.56
However, the sentence remains
constitutionally permissible under the Eighth Amendment,57 and many
individuals are still serving juvenile life without parole sentences across the
country.58 Evidence shows that the punishment disproportionately affects
people of color, those who experience trauma growing up, and those who lie
at the intersection of those identities and experiences.59 Thus, despite the
downward trend in new juvenile life without parole sentences, it is important
to understand the history and development of the criminal justice system as
it applies to youth.
B. How Children Become Defendants
In the span of a century, the process by which the law handled children
who commit crimes shifted from rehabilitative to punitive.60 The story of
children in the justice system begins with the Progressive reform movement
of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.61 In response to the
burgeoning industrial society of the United States and the urbanization and
immigration that came with it, Progressive reformers, who were mostly white
upper- and middle-class city-dwellers, invoked the principle of parens
patriae62 to increase the presence of the state in traditionally private family
matters.63
Commentators regard the creation of juvenile court as the crowning
achievement of Progressive-Era welfarism.64 Progressive reformers’
invention of a separate court system for children stemmed from their belief
that the government had an interest in stepping in to protect children.65 The
bedrock principles of Progressive-Era juvenile courts were that children were
different from adults, and that childhood was worth protecting.66 For
Progressives, these principles warranted the creation of a separate system of
justice for children.67 The early juvenile justice system was oriented not
56. See Legislation Eliminating Life-Without-Parole Sentences for Juveniles,
JUVENILE SENT’G PROJECT, https://juvenilesentencingproject.org/legislation-eliminatinglwop/ [https://perma.cc/P3MY-5PCE] (last visited Nov. 7, 2022).
57. See infra Part I.C.
58. See Rovner, supra note 40.
59. See supra notes 44–55 and accompanying text.
60. See Guggenheim, supra note 16, at 466; see also Tina M. Robinson, I Wish I Knew
Then What I Know Now: Looking to the Objective Science in Evaluating Juveniles’
(In)competency, 49 SW. L. REV. 144, 147 (2020).
61. See BARRY C. FELD, THE EVOLUTION OF THE JUVENILE COURT: RACE, POLITICS, AND
THE CRIMINALIZING OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 19 (2017).
62. See id. at 24 (defining parens patriae as the doctrine that recognizes the state as a
“parent-surrogate”).
63. Id.; see also Clare Huntington & Elizabeth S. Scott, Conceptualizing Legal Childhood
in the Twenty-First Century, 118 MICH. L. REV. 1371, 1379–90 (2020) (detailing the rise of
Progressive paternalism in the arenas of child welfare and juvenile justice).
64. See Huntington & Scott, supra note 63, at 1381.
65. See id.
66. See FELD, supra note 61, at 23.
67. See id. at 26.
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around punishing children when they caused harm, but around assessing the
best interests of the child going forward.68 Though Progressives conceived
of juvenile courts as therapeutic settings,69 scholars today agree that the
Progressive project had intentional underlying motives of social control and
discrimination targeted at poor and immigrant families.70
The Progressive view of children and juvenile courts nevertheless carried
the day until 1967,71 when the Supreme Court decided In re Gault.72 Gerald
Gault, a fifteen-year-old, was arrested after making a lewd prank phone call
to his neighbor.73 He was tried in juvenile court in a proceeding that lacked
many of the markings of a fair trial—for instance, no witnesses were present,
and the court did not produce a record of the hearing.74 The state argued that
because juvenile courts were rehabilitative and not adversarial in nature,
there was no need for procedural formality—in fact, such formality would
detract from the project of juvenile courts.75 The Court rejected that
argument and held that children were entitled to due process, even in juvenile
court.76 Gault marked a turning point in how the law treats children: by
bestowing children with procedural rights, the Court signaled that children
were independent legal actors who could make use of those rights in an
adversarial setting.77
The evolution from child to defendant crystallized in the 1990s.78 Both
political parties, in response to rising crime rates and increasingly tense race
relations, united around the common refrain that children who committed
crimes deserved to be punished like adults.79 The resulting “adult time for
adult crime”80 philosophy developed in tandem with the birth of the
mythological, racialized concept of a “superpredator.”81 According to
Professor John J. DiIulio Jr., who coined the term in a 1995 opinion piece, a
superpredator was a young criminal whose impulsivity and lack of remorse

68. See id. at 33–34; see also Vanessa Carroll, Cultivating Boyhood and Girlhood: The
Role of Gender in Progressive Era Juvenile Justice Reform in Wisconsin, 22 WIS. WOMEN’S
L.J. 133, 139 (2007).
69. See FELD, supra note 61, at 31.
70. See id.; see also Huntington & Scott, supra note 63, at 1382.
71. FELD, supra note 61, at 31; see also Huntington & Scott, supra note 63, at 1386 (noting
that by the 1960s, critics of juvenile delinquency proceedings began to deride the informal
procedures and the fact that the proceedings often harmed children of color under the guise of
benevolence and welfare).
72. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
73. Id. at 4–5.
74. See id. at 5.
75. See id. at 25–26; see also Guggenheim, supra note 16, at 467.
76. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 30–31.
77. See FELD, supra note 61, at 64.
78. See id. at 89.
79. See id.; see also Huntington & Scott, supra note 63, at 1386–87.
80. See Linda J. Collier, Adult Crime, Adult Time, WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 1998, at C01
(arguing that “[c]hildren who knowingly engage in adult conduct and adult crimes should
automatically be subject to adult rules and adult prison time”).
81. See FELD, supra note 61, at 105.
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posed a threat to society.82 No significant statistical evidence supported the
existence of the superpredator.83 Rather, the racially coded figure stoked fear
and disdain, primarily toward Black youth.84 Lawmakers seized on the
ensuing moral panic to amend transfer laws, which fundamentally changed
the treatment of children who committed crimes.85 Between 1992 and 1999,
for example, all but one state amended their transfer laws to make it easier
for children to be tried in adult court and receive adult sentences.86
Transfer laws dictate how and under what circumstances the law
authorizes children to be transferred from juvenile court to adult criminal
court.87 Generally, children are transferred to adult court when charged with
serious crimes.88 There are three main, overlapping mechanisms by which
children end up in adult court: judicial waiver, legislative offense exclusion,
and prosecutorial direct file.89 First, judicial waiver statutes exist in a
majority of states and permit judges to waive juvenile court jurisdiction and
transfer a child to criminal court after conducting a hearing to determine the
child’s amenability to treatment and their threat to public safety.90 Second,
because legislatures create juvenile courts, statutes may also delineate
whether and when a child will be transferred to adult court based on the
child’s age and the severity of the offense.91 For example, a sixteen-year-old
convicted of murder might be eligible for juvenile court in some states but
ineligible in others.92 Finally, prosecutorial direct file refers to a prosecutor’s
choice to directly charge a crime in adult court when juvenile courts and adult
courts share concurrent jurisdiction.93
As a result of the racialized fear of the 1990s, “get tough” laws worked to
lower the age of eligibility for transfer, thus capturing a larger swath of young
offenders than before.94 These laws also shifted discretion to prosecutors,
who could charge crimes more aggressively because they were not bound by
judicial neutrality.95 The story of how children like Henry Montgomery
become criminal defendants in adult court is thus a story of Supreme Court
jurisprudence dating back to In re Gault. Part I.C explains the other part of
Montgomery’s story by summarizing the development of juvenile life
without parole sentences in Supreme Court jurisprudence.
82. See Carroll Bogert & Lynnell Hancock, Superpredator: The Media Myth that
Demonized a Generation of Black Youth, MARSHALL PROJECT (Nov. 20, 2020),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/11/20/superpredator-the-media-myth-thatdemonized-a-generation-of-black-youth [https://perma.cc/D4AF-BL6G].
83. Id.
84. See FELD, supra note 61, at 105.
85. Id.
86. Mills et al., supra note 52, at 585.
87. See FELD, supra note 61, at 108.
88. Id. at 109.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 109–10.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 110, 115.
94. Id. at 110.
95. Id.
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C. Juvenile Life Without Parole at the Supreme Court
The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment.96 The
Supreme Court has noted that “protection against disproportionate
punishment is the central substantive guarantee of the Eighth Amendment.”97
The Court employs a two-step “evolving standards of decency” analysis to
determine whether a punishment violates the Eighth Amendment.98 At the
first step, the Court reviews “objective indicia” of society’s evolving
standards of decency that demonstrate a consensus against a particular
criminal sanction.99 To ascertain whether there is a national consensus
against the punishment at issue, the Court looks to legislative enactments and
state practice across the country.100 The second step requires the Court to
exercise “its own independent judgment” to determine whether the
punishment comports with the Court’s precedent and the history and purpose
of the Eighth Amendment.101
Although evidence of national consensus against a form of punishment is
“entitled to great weight,” it is not on its own determinative: the ultimate
task of interpreting the Eighth Amendment remains the province of the
Court.102 When exercising its own independent judgment to assess the
constitutionality of a punishment, the Court balances the culpability of a class
of offenders, informed by their shared characteristics, with the severity of the
punishment.103 The Court also analyzes whether the punishment as applied
to that class of offenders serves legitimate penological purposes.104
Beginning with Eddings v. Oklahoma,105 the Supreme Court has issued a
series of decisions interpreting the Eighth Amendment to protect children
from extreme punishment. At the core of the Court’s jurisprudence is the
premise that children are less culpable than adults.106 This section
96. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
97. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 206 (2016).
98. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1958); see also Weems v. United States, 217
U.S. 349, 378 (1910) (noting that the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth
Amendment “is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion
becomes enlightened by a humane justice”); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 821
(1988) (pointing out that the drafters of the Eighth Amendment delegated the task of
determining which punishments are cruel and unusual “to future generations of judges”).
99. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005).
100. Id. at 563.
101. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 61 (2010).
102. Id. at 67.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 67–68.
105. 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
106. See id. at 115–16 (noting that “youth is more than a chronological fact . . . [i]t is a time
and condition of life when a person may be most susceptible to influence and psychological
damage,” and that “[e]ven the normal 16-year-old customarily lacks the maturity of an adult”);
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 823 (1988) (relying on the “experience of mankind”
to uphold a ban on capital punishment for those under sixteen at the time of the crime); Roper
v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 553–54 (2005) (holding that neither retribution nor deterrence, as
penological goals, can justify the imposition of the death penalty on children because the
Eighth Amendment prohibits the state’s “extinguish[ing] [a child’s] life and [their] potential
to attain a mature understanding of [their] own humanity”); Graham, 560 U.S. at 68 (holding
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summarizes the Supreme Court’s youth-punishment cases, beginning with
Eddings and ending with Jones.
In Eddings, the Supreme Court considered whether the trial court erred
when it refused to consider, as a matter of law, mitigating evidence of a
sixteen-year-old’s traumatic childhood and emotional disturbance before
imposing the death penalty for first-degree murder.107 The Court held that
the sentencing court violated the Constitution when it sentenced Monty Lee
Eddings to death.108 The Court found that the decisions of the lower courts
ran afoul of the rule announced in Lockett v. Ohio.109 In Lockett, the Court
made clear that a sentencing court in a capital punishment case must be
permitted to consider any relevant mitigating factor or evidence.110 In
Eddings, the Court noted that “[e]ven the normal [sixteen-year-old]” lacks
the maturity of an adult.111 Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr., writing for the
majority, further noted that Eddings was not a normal sixteen-year-old.112
Eddings grew up with “serious emotional problems” and experienced neglect
and violence at home.113 These factors were relevant to the question of an
appropriate punishment and the Court held that the trial court should have
considered evidence of Eddings’s childhood as mitigating evidence.114
The Court came closer to issuing a categorical ban on the death penalty for
children in Thompson v. Oklahoma.115 In Thompson, the Court held that the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the imposition of the death
penalty on children who were under sixteen at the time of their offense.116
William Thompson and three other individuals were convicted of murdering
Thompson’s former brother-in-law.117 The trial court sentenced Thompson,
then fifteen years old, to death.118
Using the Court’s
evolving-standards-of-decency analysis, Justice John Paul Stevens first
invoked the words of Justice Powell to express that “the experience of
mankind” recognizes fundamental differences between children and
adults.119 Before addressing the central question of whether the Eighth
Amendment prohibited imposing the death penalty on children under sixteen,
Justice Stevens highlighted some more quotidian examples of how state and
that life without parole sentences for nonhomicide crimes committed by youth violate the
Eighth Amendment because children are less culpable); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471
(2012) (stating that “children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of
sentencing” because of their “diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform”).
107. Eddings, 455 U.S. at 113–15.
108. See id. at 104, 117.
109. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
110. Eddings, 455 U.S. at 112.
111. Id. at 116.
112. Id.
113. See id.
114. Id. at 116–17.
115. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
116. Id. at 838.
117. See id. at 819.
118. Id.
119. See id. at 823 (quoting Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 590–91 (1975) (Powell, J.,
dissenting)).
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federal law treated children differently than adults.120 For instance, children
under sixteen were not able to vote, sit on a jury, marry without parental
consent, or purchase alcohol.121 For the Thompson majority, these
well-settled122 distinctions between the legal treatment of children and adults
cautioned against imposing adult punishment on children, even when they
commit ostensibly adult crimes.123
The Court then determined that trends among state legislatures, juries,
prosecutors, and the international community all advised against the
acceptability of capital punishment for those under sixteen.124 Articulating
the Court’s independent judgment, Justice Stevens reasoned that children are
less culpable than adults and thus should not receive the same punishment.125
Justice Stevens further opined that children are so fundamentally different
from adults that the basis for such a conclusion “is too obvious to require
extended explanation.”126
Nearly twenty years after Thompson, the Court issued its first categorical
ban on extreme punishment for children in Roper v. Simmons.127 At
seventeen, Christopher Simmons committed what the Court described as a
“chilling, callous” murder for which he was sentenced to death.128 At trial,
Simmons presented mitigating evidence to show the jury that his difficult
home background, erratic attendance at school, and early substance use
should temper the severity of his punishment.129 The question presented to
the Supreme Court in Roper was whether the Eighth Amendment forbids
capital punishment of a juvenile offender older than fifteen but younger than
eighteen at the time of the crime.130
Writing for the majority, Justice Anthony Kennedy answered that the
Eighth Amendment did prohibit the imposition of the death penalty on all
individuals under eighteen.131
Employing the Court’s two-part
evolving-standards-of-decency analysis, Justice Kennedy first assessed the
objective indicia of national consensus against the punishment.132 At the
time, thirty states had already abolished the death penalty as applied to
children.133 Among states that had not prohibited the punishment, its
imposition was nevertheless infrequent.134 Based on this pattern, the Court

120. See id.
121. See id.
122. See id.
123. See id. at 836–38.
124. Id. at 833.
125. Id. at 834.
126. Id. at 835; see also Gina Kim, Note, The Impermissibility of Police Deception in
Juvenile Interrogations, 91 FORDHAM L. REV. 247, 266 & n.151 (2022).
127. 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005).
128. Id. at 556.
129. See id. at 559.
130. Id. at 555–56.
131. Id. at 575.
132. Id. at 564.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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identified a national consensus among the states that children are
categorically less culpable than adults.135
Justice Kennedy then set forth the Court’s independent judgment.136 In
holding that the death penalty for children violates the Eighth Amendment,
Justice Kennedy articulated three fundamental differences that set children
apart from adults in the criminal punishment context.137 First, children lack
maturity and tend to act more recklessly as a result.138 Second, children are
more vulnerable to outside pressures and the circumstances of their
upbringing and environment because they lack the resources and ability to
fully extricate themselves from negative influences.139 Third, a child’s
personality is not as fully formed as that of an adult; because children’s
characters are still in flux as they grow older, crimes they commit as children
are more likely to reflect “transient immaturity” than a permanently immoral
and depraved character.140 Justice Kennedy emphasized that even children
who commit brutal crimes are capable of change.141 The Court’s
identification of these broad distinctions between children and adults drew
on a combination of scientific data and what “any parent knows.”142 These
tenets were sufficient to support a total ban on the imposition of the death
penalty for individuals under eighteen.143
Despite the Court’s categorical declaration, Justice Kennedy
acknowledged that, at least hypothetically, there could exist a child who
defied the three principles that distinguish children from adults.144 Even
though the Court outlined reasons for finding children as a class to be less
deserving of punishment than adults, it nevertheless acknowledged that there
could be a child who was just as culpable as an adult.145 Roper stands out as
the first instance in which the Court issued a categorical ban on a specific
punishment for children. But it also signifies the moment at which the Court
opened the door to rhetoric surrounding potential “depravity” in children.146
Six years later, the Court issued a second categorical ban on punishment
for children in Graham v. Florida.147 The Court held that life without parole
is an unconstitutional punishment if imposed for a nonhomicide offense
committed by a child.148 Terrance Graham was sentenced to life without
parole for an attempted robbery.149 The Court vacated his conviction,

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id.
Id. at 575.
Id. at 569–70.
Id. at 569.
Id. at 570.
Id. at 573.
See id. at 570.
Id. at 569.
Id. at 572.
Id.
Id.
Id.
560 U.S. 48 (2010).
Id. at 82.
Id. at 57.
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holding that the Eighth Amendment bars a sentence of life without parole for
children when they commit nonhomicide offenses.150 Writing for the
majority again, Justice Kennedy drew primarily from the analysis set forth in
Roper to justify a complete bar on life without parole for nonhomicide
offenses.151 Justice Kennedy echoed his Roper majority opinion by citing
not only neuroscientific principles and other data, but also the common sense
notion that “equat[ing] the failings of a minor with those of an adult” would
be “misguided.”152
As in Roper, the Court in Graham acknowledged the possibility that there
could be children who deserve to be punished like adults because of
psychological maturity, evidence of serious depravity, or both.153 However,
the Court again referenced the difficulty of finding a child to be permanently
irredeemable to caution against punishing adults like children in practice.154
According to Graham, even assuming that it were possible for a child to be
just as culpable as an adult, the task of differentiating between children who
have the capacity for change and those who do not is near impossible.155
When the Court decided to hear Miller v. Alabama, a consolidated decision
containing the cases of two fourteen-year-olds sentenced to life without
parole for murder, previous decisions made the Court seem amenable to
issuing a third categorical ban.156 However, the Court ultimately declined
the invitation.157 Instead, the majority in Miller held that life without parole
sentences imposed on children are only unconstitutional when the sentencing
scheme mandates the imposition of the punishment.158
On the one hand, Miller built on Roper and Graham by reemphasizing that
children are constitutionally different from adults.159 The Court emphasized
that its findings with respect to youth were grounded in “common sense.”160
Miller determined that a mandatory minimum sentence of life without parole
as applied to children is unconstitutional because it strips sentencing
authorities of the ability to consider the distinctive attributes of a defendant’s
youth.161 The Court provided the following factors as examples of such
attendant characteristics: immaturity, impetuosity, family and home life, the
150. Id. at 82.
151. See Guggenheim, supra note 16, at 462 (noting that the Court “borrowed all of the
ideas underlying its conclusion [in Graham] . . . that the Constitution categorically forbids
imposing a sentence less than death on certain juveniles . . . from Roper”).
152. Graham, 560 U.S. at 68 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005)).
153. Id. at 77.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. See Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Revisits Issue of Harsh Sentences for Juveniles,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/21/us/supreme-courtrevisits-issue-of-sentences-for-juveniles.html [https://perma.cc/G94D-7KUL] (noting that a
majority of justices “appeared prepared to take an additional step in limiting [juvenile life
without parole sentences], but it was not clear whether it would be modest or large”).
157. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012).
158. Id. at 489.
159. Id. at 471.
160. Id.
161. See id. at 474.
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circumstances of the offense, familial and peer pressure, inability to deal with
law enforcement and attorneys, and the possibility of reform.162 Courts and
commentators now treat these characteristics as the “Miller factors.”163
For Miller, those attributes would have been important considerations in
determining his sentence. By the time of his crime, Miller had been in and
out of foster care due to his mother’s struggle with addiction and his
stepfather’s abuse.164 Miller also began using alcohol and drugs as a child.165
Throughout his childhood, Miller attempted suicide four times, with the first
attempt occurring when he was six years old.166 The Court reasoned that
Miller’s traumatic upbringing affected his decision to commit a crime.167
The Court considered it “beyond question” that Miller deserved punishment
for his crime; however, the fact that the sentencing judge did not have the
discretion to consider the effect of Miller’s childhood in his decision-making
and actions constituted a violation of the Eighth Amendment.168
On the other hand, Miller signified a departure from precedent as well.169
Though the Court recognized that children are categorically different from
adults for sentencing purposes, the Court stopped short of issuing a
categorical ban like those in Roper and Graham.170 Furthermore, the Court
relied on its belief in children’s diminished culpability and heightened
capacity for change in Roper and Graham to note that “appropriate occasions
for sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty will be
uncommon.”171 In so holding, the Court reasoned that finding a child who
is “permanently incorrigible” would be exceedingly difficult, thus protecting
all but a few children from receiving the maximum sentence of life without
parole.172
The majority relied on the figure of the “rare juvenile offender whose
crime reflects irreparable corruption”173 to support its prediction that most
young offenders are capable of reform.174 However, the majority did not
declare how courts should draw the line between redeemable and
irredeemable.175 Thus, after Miller, child defendants convicted of homicide
are still eligible for a life without parole sentence so long as the sentencing
judge had occasion to hear mitigating evidence.176
162. Id. at 477–78.
163. Marshall, supra note 38, at 1643 n.74.
164. Miller, 567 U.S. at 467.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 478–79.
168. Id. at 479.
169. See Marshall, supra note 38, at 1636.
170. See Miller, 567 U.S. at 479.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 479–80.
173. Id. (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005)).
174. See id.
175. See id. at 480.
176. Id. at 479; see also Mary Berkheiser, Developmental Detour: How the Minimalism of
Miller v. Alabama Led the Court’s “Kids Are Different” Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence
Down a Blind Alley, 46 AKRON L. REV. 489, 497 (2013).
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In Montgomery v. Louisiana,177 the Court held that Miller applied
retroactively.178 The Court found that Miller announced a new substantive
rule of constitutional law.179 Because Miller concluded that mandatory
juvenile life without parole sentences are unconstitutional, the majority
reasoned that the ruling created a risk that many juvenile lifers’ sentences
violated the Constitution.180 The Court noted that Miller prescribes a
procedure whereby a court considers youth and its characteristics as part of
a sentencing hearing.181 Thus, Montgomery opened the door for individuals
serving pre-Miller juvenile life without parole sentences to resentencing or
parole consideration.182
Most recently, the Court held in Jones v. Mississippi that neither its
precedent nor the Eighth Amendment requires a sentencing court to make a
separate factual finding of permanent incorrigibility before sentencing a child
to life in prison.183 Brett Jones was fifteen years old when he was convicted
of killing his grandfather.184 Like many juvenile lifers, Jones had an
opportunity for a resentencing after the Supreme Court decided Miller and
Montgomery.185 At Jones’s resentencing, the judge “acknowledged that he
had discretion” under the recent decisions to impose a lesser sentence but
determined that life without parole remained appropriate.186 Jones appealed,
arguing that in order to comply with Miller, a sentencing judge must make a
separate factual finding that the defendant is permanently incorrigible.187 At
the very least, Jones argued that sentencing judges must make an
on-the-record explanation with an implicit finding of incorrigibility.188
The majority firmly rejected both of Jones’s arguments in holding that a
sentencing judge having discretion to impose a lower sentence is “both
constitutionally necessary and constitutionally sufficient.”189 Accordingly,
Jones officially foreclosed the inference that many lower courts had been
making based on Graham, Miller, and Montgomery: that sentencing a child
to life requires finding that a child is permanently incapable of
rehabilitation.190
177. 577 U.S. 190 (2016).
178. Id. at 212.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 210.
182. Id. at 212.
183. Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307, 1319 (2021).
184. Id. at 1309.
185. Id. at 1313.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. See id. at 1321; see, e.g., United States v. Conyers, 227 F. Supp. 3d 280, 287 (S.D.N.Y.
2016) (holding that juveniles may be sentenced to life imprisonment so long as the court “finds
that the defendant is irredeemable and so culpable as to warrant a life sentence”); People v.
Botello, 259 Cal. Rptr. 3d 93, 103 (Ct. App. 2020) (finding that a trial court judge must
“expressly find ‘irreparable corruption’ or ‘permanent incorrigibility’ prior to imposing life
without parole sentences upon juvenile offenders”); People v. Holman, 91 N.E.3d 849, 863
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In light of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, Part II highlights how even
before Jones, courts fractured on the question of whether to employ the
permanent incorrigibility principle. Part II then examines the way in which
Jones exacerbated the inconsistency.
II. ARE COURTS CONSIDERING YOUTH?
“Do you think that there are any human beings who are not capable of
redemption?”191 Justice Alito posed this question to counsel for Brett Jones
during oral argument in Jones.192 The central issue in Jones was whether
sentencing judges must make a specific finding that a child is permanently
incorrigible—that is, not capable of rehabilitation or redemption—before
imposing a sentence of life without parole.193
Early in oral argument, Justice Alito remarked that asking judges to make
such a determination would lead “the courts of this country into very deep
theological and psychological waters.”194 While critics of the decision
claimed that the Court’s rejection of the permanent incorrigibility principle
stripped Miller and Montgomery of their substance and protective power,195
the notion that the incorrigibility inquiry is problematic unites both Justice
Alito, who joined the majority opinion, and critics of the decision.196
This part explores the problems and inconsistencies arising out of courts’
application of Miller and Montgomery. Part II.A analyzes pre-Jones
decisions to illustrate that some courts adopted the permanent incorrigibility
principle and some did not. Part II.B then looks at post-Jones cases to show
early trends. Finally, Part II.C analyzes arguments about judicial discretion,
which lie at the center of the sentencing debate.
A. Applying Miller and Montgomery in the Lower Courts: Justice by
Geography?
Following Montgomery’s announcement that Miller introduced a new
substantive rule of constitutional law,197 lower courts applied varying
standards in sentencing new juvenile lifers and resentencing individuals
already serving mandatory life without parole sentences.198 This part argues
(Ill. 2017) (interpreting Miller to mean that a child may be sentenced to life without parole
“only if the trial court determines that the defendant’s conduct showed irretrievable depravity,
permanent incorrigibility, or irreparable corruption beyond the possibility of rehabilitation”).
191. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 38, at 16.
192. Id.; see also Terrell Carter, Rachel López & Kempis Songster, Redeeming Justice, 116
NW. U. L. REV. 315, 317 (2021).
193. Jones, 141 S. Ct. at 1311.
194. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 38, at 15.
195. See Jones, 141 S. Ct. at 1328 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority
“gut[ted]” Miller and Montgomery); see also Cohen, supra note 33.
196. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
197. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 212 (2016).
198. See Alice Reichman Hoesterey, Confusion in Montgomery’s Wake: State Responses,
the Mandates of Montgomery, and Why a Complete Categorical Ban on Life Without Parole
for Juveniles Is the Only Constitutional Option, 45 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 149, 161 (2017)
(noting that the key disagreements between states in interpreting Miller after Montgomery
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that these differences create “justice by geography.”199 Specifically, it
analyzes cases that demonstrate the way in which courts and judges applied
their own gloss to Miller.200 To establish a baseline, Part II.A.1 summarizes
the reasoning of courts that have either abolished or created presumptions
against juvenile life without parole sentences. Part II.A.2 then presents cases
in which appellate courts found that lower courts had inadequately
considered youth. Finally, Part II.A.3 discusses cases in which appellate
courts held that a finding of permanent incorrigibility was unnecessary.
1. States That Have Abolished or Adopted Presumptions Against Juvenile
Life Without Parole
Over the last eight years, several states have eliminated or restricted
juvenile life without parole sentences.201 While most states have banned the
sentence through legislation,202 Iowa and Massachusetts have abolished
juvenile life without parole sentences through their courts.203 Similarly,
Pennsylvania courts have created a strong presumption against life without
parole for individuals under eighteen.204 This section discusses those
decisions and their implications in turn.

stem from whether to interpret Montgomery as permitting discretion in sentencing or instead
as obligating the creation of additional protections for children).
199. The phrase “justice by geography” originally described the way in which juvenile
justice administration varies by jurisdiction and even within jurisdictions. See Barry C. Feld,
Justice by Geography: Urban, Suburban, and Rural Variations in Juvenile Justice
Administration, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 156, 157 (1991). This Note employs the term
to refer to the fact that the imposition of juvenile life without parole sentences similarly varies
by state, circuit, and even judge.
200. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 489 (2012) (holding that a judge or jury “must
have the opportunity” to consider the mitigating qualities of youth before imposing life
without parole); Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 195 (noting that Miller required sentencing courts
to consider children’s “diminished culpability and heightened capacity for change” before
imposing a sentence of life without parole).
201. See A State-By-State Look at Juvenile Life Without Parole, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(July
13,
2017),
https://apnews.com/article/9debc3bdc7034ad2a68e62911fba0d85
[https://perma.cc/AT6N-5MB5].
202. See, e.g., VT. STAT. tit. 13, § 7045 (2022); NEV. REV. STAT. § 176.025 (2021); S.B. 9,
147th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2013) (amending DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 636(b),
4209, 4209A, 4204(A) (2012)); H.B. 4210, 81st Leg., 2d Sess. (W. Va. 2014) (enacting
W. VA. CODE §§ 61-11-23, 62-12-13b (2014)); S.B. 294, 91st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark.
2017) (amending ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-4-104(b), 5-4-602(3), 5-10-101(c), 16-93-612(e),
16-93-613, 16-93-614, 16-93-618 (2016)); S.B. 394, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017)
(amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 3051 (West 2016)).
203. See Iowa Supreme Court Abolishes Death-in-Prison Sentences for Children, EQUAL
JUST. INITIATIVE (May 7, 2016), https://eji.org/news/iowa-supreme-court-abolishes-juvenilelife-without-parole/ [https://perma.cc/BF7J-6Z9C]; Ray Sanchez, Massachusetts Top Court
Strikes Down Life Without Parole for Juveniles, CNN (Dec. 24, 2013, 1:30 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2013/12/24/justice/massachusetts-life-without-parole-junveniles/
index.html [https://perma.cc/XQ5K-NB4K].
204. See The Batts II Decision: The Favorable and Where It Falls Short, ABOLITIONIST L.
CTR. (June 29, 2017), https://abolitionistlawcenter.org/2017/06/29/the-batts-ii-decision-thefavorable-and-where-it-falls-short/ [https://perma.cc/DD6R-UHU5].
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In Diatchenko v. District Attorney for Suffolk District,205 decided a year
after Miller, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ruled that the
discretionary imposition of a sentence of life without parole for a
seventeen-year-old convicted of homicide violated the state constitution.206
Gregory Diatchenko appealed his sentence thirty-one years after being
convicted of first-degree murder.207 Exercising its authority to interpret the
Massachusetts state constitution to extend greater protection than the U.S.
Constitution, the court held that even discretionary life without parole
sentences violated the protections of the Massachusetts constitution.208 In
reaching its conclusion, the court emphasized advancements in adolescent
brain development research and the “myriad significant ways” that this
development affects a child’s personality, behavior, and actions.209 Because
an adolescent’s brain and character are still developing by the age of
eighteen, the court reasoned that no judge can determine at the point of
sentencing that a child is irretrievably depraved at the point of sentencing.210
The court then held that because of a child’s capacity for change, any life
without parole sentence would foreclose opportunities for reform and release,
in violation of the state constitution.211
Three years later, the Iowa Supreme Court similarly issued a categorical
ban on juvenile life without parole in State v. Sweet.212 When he was
seventeen, Isaiah Sweet shot and killed his grandfather and his grandfather’s
wife, both of whom had raised Sweet after his birth mother was unable to
care for him.213 According to Sweet, his grandfather was verbally and
emotionally abusive and regularly told Sweet to kill himself.214 By the time
of the murders, Sweet had attempted suicide several times.215 Sweet also
abused drugs, was a binge drinker, and engaged in reckless behavior with
friends, including asking a friend to burn him with a cigarette fifteen times.216
At his sentencing, the defense offered the expert testimony of Dr. Stephen
Hart, a clinical psychologist who specialized in assessing violence,

205. 1 N.E.3d 270 (Mass. 2013).
206. Id. at 284–85.
207. Id. at 286.
208. Id. at 283, 284–85.
209. Id. at 283–84.
210. Id. at 284–85 (“Simply put, because the brain of a juvenile is not fully developed,
either structurally or functionally, by the age of eighteen, a judge cannot find with confidence
that a particular offender, at that point in time, is irretrievably depraved.”).
211. Id. at 285.
212. 879 N.W.2d 811 (Iowa 2016).
213. Id. at 812. The court noted that the events leading up to Sweet’s placement with his
grandparents were unclear. Sweet reported that a neighbor raped him when he was four,
causing authorities to terminate his parents’ rights. Sweet’s mother reported that she could
not pursue custody because she was in a domestic violence situation, but that she did not want
Sweet to live with his grandfather because he and his wife abused Sweet’s mother as a child.
See id. at 814.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 815.
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predicting risk, and diagnosing psychopathic personality disorder.217 Based
on Sweet’s upbringing, environment, age, and early-onset severe attention
deficit disorder, Dr. Hart concluded that Sweet’s ability to make decisions
was severely limited by immaturity.218
He further testified that
seventeen-year-old Sweet’s developmental age was somewhere between
twelve and fourteen.219 Dr. Hart testified that Sweet’s prospects for
rehabilitation were “mixed” and estimated that a determination as to his
potential for rehabilitation could be made when Sweet turned thirty.220 After
hearing this testimony and Sweet’s own testimony that he was remorseful,
the trial court sentenced Sweet to life in prison without the possibility of
parole.221 The judge listed the Miller factors but focused on the nature of the
crime and characterized Dr. Hart’s assessment of Sweet’s potential for
reform as “overly optimistic.”222
On appeal, the Iowa Supreme Court expressly rejected the “minimalist
approach” of deciding whether Sweet was permanently incorrigible under
Roper and Miller.223 The court instead focused on what it perceived as a core
tension in Miller.224 Though sentencing judges had discretion over when to
impose life without parole on a child offender, use of the Miller factors to
determine the issue of rehabilitation potential and permanent incorrigibility
was overly speculative and impossible in practice.225 The court emphasized
that, because of the nature of youth, asking a sentencing judge to apply the
Miller factors in a principled manner would be “asking the sentencer to do
the impossible.”226 The court also noted the risk of inconsistent analysis
when considering the mitigating factors of a child’s upbringing: while some
judges could interpret trauma as a result of abuse and neglect as cutting
against prospects for rehabilitation, others could see the trauma as a
“contraindication” for life without parole, because it would remain to be
determined how the individual would develop in a structured, rehabilitative
environment.227 Therefore, the court issued a categorical ban on juvenile life
without parole sentences.228 The court further determined that parole boards
would be better suited to discerning whether and when children who commit
crimes may be released.229

217. Id.
218. Id. at 816.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 834.
224. Id. at 836–37.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 837.
227. Id. at 838.
228. Id. at 839.
229. Id. (noting that parole boards may be able to answer the question of irreparable
corruption only after time has passed and “opportunities for maturation and rehabilitation have
been provided, and . . . a record of success or failure in the rehabilitative process is available”).
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In Commonwealth v. Batts,230 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania took a
different approach, opting to keep the possibility of imposing juvenile life
without parole open, but restricting it by creating a presumption against it.
Qu’eed Batts was fourteen years old when he was sentenced to life in prison
without the possibility of parole.231 Batts was born to a thirteen-year-old
mother and, beginning at age five, moved within the foster care system on
his own.232 When Batts was in the ninth grade, an older member of a gang
instructed Batts to shoot and kill two other teenage boys.233 Batts complied,
afraid that the older member would kill him if he did not do as he was told.234
The trial court sentenced Batts to life in prison without parole after finding
that Batts had failed to satisfy his burden of proving by a preponderance of
the evidence that his case should be transferred to juvenile court.235 Despite
extensive lay and expert testimony supporting Batts’s chances of
rehabilitation, the trial judge determined Batts was a “severe threat to the
public” with a “well-developed criminal mentality.”236
In hearing Batts’s case for the second time,237 the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania adopted a presumption against the imposition of life without
parole for children.238 Responding to the state legislature’s failure to take
“appreciable steps” to create or revise sentencing statutes to protect children
convicted of first-degree murder prior to Miller, the court invoked its judicial
authority to devise a new safeguard.239 Its solution was to create a strong
presumption against the imposition of life without parole for individuals
under eighteen.240 To impose a juvenile life without parole sentence,
Pennsylvania prosecutors bear the burden of proving that a child is deserving
of the sentence beyond a reasonable doubt.241 The key principle underlying
this presumption is that all children—even those who commit brutal
crimes—are capable of rehabilitation.242
One commentator has
characterized Batts as a reasonable interpretation of Supreme Court
precedent and an example of a state court exercising its authority to create
additional protections beyond those articulated by the Supreme Court’s
230. 163 A.3d 410 (Pa. 2017).
231. See id. at 415.
232. See id. at 416 (noting that, between the ages of five through twelve, Batts lived in
eleven homes across nine cities and two states, and transferred schools eleven times).
233. See id. at 417.
234. See id.
235. See id. at 418.
236. Commonwealth v. Batts, 66 A.3d 286, 288–89 (Pa. 2013).
237. See Casey Matsumoto, “Permanently Incorrigible” Is a Patently Ineffective
Standard: Reforming the Administration of Juvenile Life Without Parole, 88 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 239, 260 (2020).
238. See Batts, 163 A.3d at 459–60.
239. See id. at 450–51.
240. See id. at 459–60.
241. See id. at 455.
242. See id. at 451–52 (stating that a presumption arises “if a fact constitutes ‘a conclusion
firmly based upon the generally known results of wide human experience,’” and that the core
principle of Roper, Graham, Miller, and Montgomery is that children change as they age and
are thus capable of rehabilitation (quoting Watkins v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 173 A. 644,
648 (Pa. 1934))).
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decisions.243 State supreme courts in Connecticut, Indiana, Missouri, and
Utah have crafted presumptions against life without parole under their state
constitutions.244
Diatchenko, Sweet, and Batts are examples of courts going beyond the
Supreme Court’s decisions to abolish or restrict juvenile life without parole
under state constitutions. All three decisions also indicate judicial reckoning
with the permanent incorrigibility standard and whether and how it should be
applied before sentencing children to life without parole. While Diatchenko
and Sweet swept broadly to abolish the sentence altogether, Batts represents
a significant protection in the form of a strong presumption against juvenile
life without parole.245 The next section presents cases in which appellate
courts vacated sentences because trial judges did not make a finding of
permanent incorrigibility.
2. Cases Finding an Inadequate Consideration Under the Permanent
Incorrigibility Principle
After Miller and Montgomery, some courts interpreted the decisions as
requiring a finding of permanent incorrigibility before imposing a sentence
of life without parole on a person under age eighteen. In Veal v. State,246 the
Supreme Court of Georgia held that a trial court’s failure to make a finding
that the defendant was permanently incorrigible required a remand for
resentencing.247 Robert Veal was seventeen when he committed the crimes
for which he was prosecuted.248 The prosecutor recommended life without
parole, arguing that the deterrent effect of the sentence would outweigh any
possibility that Veal would “have some moment of self-reflection 30 years
down the road.”249 At sentencing, the judge did not explicitly address Veal’s
age or the characteristics of his youth and upbringing.250
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Georgia interpreted Montgomery as
permitting juvenile life without parole sentences only for rare offenders
whose crimes exhibit irretrievable depravity and who are thus incapable of
rehabilitation.251 The court determined that the trial court had not made the
determination of incorrigibility that Miller and Montgomery required.252

243. See Matsumoto, supra note 237, at 262.
244. See Hoesterey, supra note 198, at 165; State v. Riley, 110 A.3d 1205, 1214 (Conn.
2015); Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864, 871 (Ind. 2012); State v. Hart, 404 S.W.3d 232, 241
(Mo. 2013); State v. Houston, 353 P.3d 55, 77, 83 (Utah 2015).
245. See Batts, 163 A.3d at 460.
246. 784 S.E.2d 403 (Ga. 2016).
247. Id. at 412.
248. Id. at 405.
249. Id. at 409.
250. Id. (noting that, at sentencing, the trial judge said only, “based on the evidence and, in
particular—please make sure all cell phones are turned off . . .—it’s the intent of the court that
the defendant be sentenced to the maximum” (alteration in original)).
251. Id. at 411–12.
252. Id.
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A California Court of Appeal made a similar finding in People v.
Padilla.253 After serving fifteen years of his life-without-parole sentence,
Mario Salvador Padilla filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus asking for
a resentencing under Miller.254 The court found that judges operating under
Miller must answer the question of whether a child’s crime reflects
irreparable corruption rather than transient immaturity. 255 The distinction
between these two points is a question of permanent incorrigibility.256
Furthermore, Montgomery instituted a “stringent” requirement that courts
determine the existence of permanent incorrigibility.257 In remanding
Padilla’s case for resentencing, the court found that the sentencing judge did
not adequately consider Padilla’s youth and his characteristics to determine
whether he was permanently incorrigible—instead, the court erroneously
focused on the nature of the crime and not the potential for Padilla’s
rehabilitation.258
In Davis v. State,259 the Wyoming Supreme Court applied similar
reasoning to a term-of-years sentence that amounted to a de facto life without
parole sentence.260 The Wyoming Supreme Court reversed and remanded
Donald Davis’s sentence because the trial court failed to adequately consider
Davis’s youth.261 The Davis court emphasized that Miller and Montgomery
provided “little guidance” to courts in making the permanent incorrigibility
determination.262 However, the Wyoming Supreme Court held that the trial
court must have abused its discretion in sentencing Davis because it did not
adequately consider Davis’s youth as a mitigating factor.263 The court
acknowledged the difficulty of parsing the trial court’s reasoning, especially
because the trial court addressed the Miller factors as an intermingled
“narrative.”264 Nonetheless, the Wyoming Supreme Court found that the
trial court did not properly weigh the Miller factors to support its finding of
permanent incorrigibility.265
The foregoing cases are instances of state courts providing a different
response to Miller and Montgomery than those discussed in Part II.A.1.
Rather than issuing categorical bans or creating strong presumptions against
juvenile life without parole, these appellate courts vacated convictions and
remanded after finding that sentencing courts had not properly considered
youth. The implication of these holdings is that some courts interpreted
253. 209 Cal. Rptr. 3d 209 (Ct. App. 2016).
254. Id. at 211.
255. Id. at 219–20.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 220–21 (holding that a trial court “must assess the Miller factors with an eye to
making an express determination” as to whether the defendant is permanently incorrigible).
258. Id. at 221.
259. 415 P.3d 666 (Wyo. 2018).
260. Id. at 677.
261. Id. at 671.
262. Id. at 680.
263. Id. at 695.
264. Id. at 688.
265. Id. at 695.
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Miller and Montgomery as requiring a finding of permanent
incorrigibility.266 The next section covers yet another distinct response to
Miller and Montgomery, discussing cases in which courts did not require a
finding of permanent incorrigibility.
3. Cases Not Requiring a Finding of Permanent Incorrigibility
Before Jones, while some state courts required a sentencing court to make
a finding of permanent incorrigibility before sentencing a child to life without
parole, others read Miller and Montgomery as only requiring the existence of
discretion in a sentencing decision.267 The U.S. Supreme Court would later
adopt the latter group’s approach in Jones.268
In People v. Skinner,269 the Michigan Supreme Court reversed the
Michigan Court of Appeals’s holding that the trial court had erred in failing
to make an explicit finding of irreparable corruption.270 The court noted that
the court of appeals’s opinion was “internally inconsistent”271 and thus
settled the question by holding that Miller and Montgomery do not require an
explicit factual finding of incorrigibility.272 The court noted that the Miller
opinion utilized the word “think” rather than “hold” in expressing that
occasions for imposing life without parole sentences would be rare.273 Thus,
according to the Michigan Supreme Court, Miller did not require a factual
finding of incorrigibility.274
The Mississippi Court of Appeals came to a similar conclusion in Ealy v.
State.275 The court found that the Eighth Amendment and the U.S. Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence do not require a specific finding of permanent
incorrigibility.276 The court found it sufficient that the sentencing judge
“heard testimony” and “witnessed Ealy’s demeanor” at a sentencing
hearing.277
Thus, after Montgomery and before Jones, state supreme courts were split
on various aspects of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, with a fundamental
disagreement over whether Miller and Montgomery required factual findings

266. See Hoesterey, supra note 198, at 161, 190–91.
267. See id. at 192–93 (presenting a table listing states that, after Montgomery but prior to
Jones, did not require a court to find a child permanently incorrigible prior to imposing a life
without parole sentence).
268. Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307, 1310 (2021).
269. 917 N.W.2d 292 (Mich. 2018).
270. Id. at 312.
271. The Michigan Court of Appeals had held that a jury was not required because no
factual finding of irreparable corruption was necessary, but, perplexingly to the Michigan
Supreme Court, it also held that the trial court had erred by failing to make a finding as to the
defendants’ incorrigibility. Id.
272. Id. at 317.
273. Id. at 312–13.
274. Id. at 317.
275. 324 So.3d 306 (Miss. Ct. App. 2019).
276. Id. at 314–15.
277. Id. at 315.
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on permanent incorrigibility.278 While Jones ostensibly answered this
question in the negative, several cases decided after Jones show that the
decision will likely contribute to further disagreement and a lack of clarity
among the states. The opinions discussed next indicate instances in which
courts grappled with the permanent incorrigibility standard and whether to
apply it. The next section discusses recent cases, decided after Jones, to
highlight how courts have fared without the permanent incorrigibility
principle.
B. The Effect of Jones
In Jones, the Supreme Court held that a sentencing court is not required to
make a factual finding of permanent incorrigibility before imposing a
sentence of life without parole on a child offender.279 Additionally,
sentencing judges are not required to make any on-the-record statements with
the underlying implication that they have deemed the defendant to be
permanently incorrigible.280 The Court held that the requirement for juvenile
life without parole to be a discretionary sentence, established by Miller, is
both constitutionally necessary and constitutionally sufficient.281 Jones
assumes that judges will carefully consider youth when they have discretion
to do so.282 Therefore, after Jones, the question of judicial discretion will
likely be an important one.283 This section discusses a set of early cases
interpreting the Court’s decision in Jones.
In State v. Haag,284 the Washington Supreme Court held that the trial court
abused its discretion in resentencing Timothy Haag, who was sentenced to
life without parole at age seventeen after being convicted of murder.285 After
the U.S. Supreme Court decided Miller, Washington passed a “Miller-fix”
statute.286 Adopted in a number of jurisdictions, these statutes create the right
to a parole hearing after a fixed number of years for people who were
sentenced to life without parole as children.287 Haag was resentenced under
Washington’s Miller-fix statute to a minimum sentence of forty-six years and
a maximum of life in prison.288 The Washington Supreme Court held that

278. Hoesterey, supra note 198, at 161.
279. 141 S. Ct. 1307, 1321 (2021).
280. Id. at 1309.
281. Id. at 1308.
282. See id. at 1317; see also supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text.
283. See Adam Lamparello, Life Imprisonment Without Parole for Juvenile Offenders:
An Analysis of Jones v. Mississippi, APP. ADVOC. BLOG (Apr. 24, 2021),
https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/appellate_advocacy/2021/04/life-imprisonment-withoutparole-for-juvenile-offenders-an-analysis-of-jones-v-mississippi.html
[https://perma.cc/AG7Y-ANEV].
284. 495 P.3d 241 (Wash. 2021).
285. Id. at 243, 244–45, 251–52.
286. See Maya L. Ramakrishnan, Providing a Meaningful Opportunity for Release:
A Proposal for Improving Washington’s Miller-Fix, 95 WASH. L. REV. 1053, 1054 (2020).
287. See id.; see also Ryan W. Scott, In Defense of the Finality of Criminal Sentences on
Collateral Review, 4 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 179, 192–93 (2014).
288. Haag, 495 P.3d at 245.
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the forty-six-year minimum sentence constituted an unconstitutional de facto
life without parole sentence.289
In remanding for resentencing, the court ruled that the lower court erred
when it emphasized retributive factors over mitigating factors such as Haag’s
youth and details of his abusive upbringing.290 While the court sympathized
with the sentencing judge’s “daunting task” of weighing the heinous details
of Haag’s crime against his youth,291 it ultimately concluded that the
sentencing court had not made a meaningful consideration of the ways in
which Haag, then seventeen, was different from an adult.292 The court noted
that a meaningful consideration of youth at sentencing requires “far more
than [a] simpl[e] recit[ation] [of] the differences between juveniles and
adults.”293 The court noted that, in considering youth, sentencing judges
must evaluate mitigating evidence and testimony of expert and lay witnesses
as appropriate.294 Crucially, the court noted that sentencing judges must
provide a thorough explanation of their reasoning.295
Finally, the Washington Supreme Court rejected the court of appeals’s
reasoning that trial courts have complete discretion to “weigh the factors
however they see fit.”296 Even under the generous abuse-of-discretion
standard,297 the court found reversible error because the trial court did not
engage in a meaningful consideration of youth.298
Justice Debra L. Stephens wrote separately to disagree with the majority’s
holding that Haag’s new term-of-years sentence amounted to a de facto
sentence of life without parole.299 She emphasized that Jones made clear that
the Eighth Amendment “permits a sentencing court to impose life without
parole sentences on juvenile homicide offenders, even if they are not
permanently incorrigible.”300 Justice Stephens also opined that though she
may have preferred an interpretation designating permanent incorrigibility as
the appropriate standard, Jones foreclosed that holding under the Eighth
Amendment.301
In United States v. Grant,302 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit held that a de facto life without parole sentence did not violate the
289. Id. at 251.
290. Id. at 245.
291. Id. at 244.
292. See id. at 247.
293. Id. (quoting State v. Delbosque, 456 P.3d 806, 814 (Wash. 2020)).
294. Id.
295. See id.
296. Id. at 249.
297. See, e.g., United States v. Ramos, 979 F.3d 994, 998 (2d Cir. 2020) (characterizing
the abuse-of-discretion standard of review as “lenient”); United States v. Johnson, 572 F.3d
449, 454 (8th Cir. 2009) (noting that the abuse-of-discretion standard is “deferential”); United
States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1255 (11th Cir. 2015) (emphasizing that although the
deference accorded to district courts “is not unlimited, it is substantial”).
298. See Haag, 495 P.3d at 251–52.
299. Id. at 252 (Stephens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
300. Id. at 254.
301. Id. at 255.
302. 9 F.4th 186 (3d Cir. 2021).
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Eighth Amendment because, under Jones, the Constitution only requires that
the sentencing court could have imposed a lower sentence on account of the
defendant’s youth.303 The Third Circuit opined that Miller actually “took
pains to preserve” life without parole sentences for children.304 Therefore,
the court opted for a narrow reading of Miller that focused on the fact that
Miller’s precise holding was a ban on mandatory, but not discretionary, life
without parole sentences.305 Then, the court found that Jones does not
guarantee particular findings or outcomes; it only guarantees that sentencing
will be discretionary.306 The court invoked Jones to note that the existence
of discretionary sentencing procedures ensures that juvenile life without
parole sentences will necessarily be rare.307 This reading assumes that judges
will wield their discretion carefully.308 Under this logic, a judge does not
have to explain their decision in “endless detail” because their consideration
of youth is assumed to be adequate.309
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit set forth an almost
identical analysis in United States v. Briones.310 There, the defendant argued
that the sentencing court did not conduct a meaningful review of whether
Briones’s crimes reflected permanent incorrigibility.311 The Ninth Circuit
emphasized that Jones does not require a finding of incorrigibility.312 During
Briones’s original sentencing, the district court judge stated that “in
mitigation I do consider the history of the abusive father, the defendant’s
youth, immaturity, his adolescent brain at the time, and the fact that it was
impacted by regular and constant abuse of alcohol and other drugs.”313 The
Ninth Circuit noted that the district judge had actually done more than what
was required under Supreme Court precedent and the Eighth Amendment.314
The Ninth Circuit thus adopted Jones’s narrow reading of Miller and
Montgomery, and rejected Briones’s argument to expand its reading of the
precedent.315 The court focused on how, when a judge possesses discretion
to consider youth, it can be assumed that the judge will do so.316 The next
section takes a closer look at the issue of judicial discretion in sentencing.

303. Id. at 198.
304. Id. at 194.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 196.
307. Id. at 196–97; see also Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307, 1321 (2021) (noting that
“a discretionary sentencing procedure suffices to ensure individualized consideration of a
defendant’s youth”).
308. See Grant, 9 F.4th at 198 (emphasizing the “general latitude” of sentencing courts).
309. See id.
310. 18 F.4th 1170 (9th Cir. 2021).
311. Id. at 1174.
312. Id. at 1175.
313. Id. at 1174.
314. Id. at 1176.
315. See id.
316. See id.
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C. Sentencing Children to Life Without Parole: A Question of Discretion
At the core of the decisions discussed above is a question of what level of
discretion to afford sentencing judges, and whether and how sentencing
judges explain their reasoning, analysis, and thought process before meting
out a punishment. The U.S. Supreme Court has long recognized and shown
appreciation for the gravity of the task that is sentencing, especially when the
defendant is a child.317 Today, some commentators stress that, in the
criminal process, sentencing is more important than trial.318
In 2005, the landmark Supreme Court case United States v. Booker319
reinvigorated judicial discretion in sentencing by holding that the once
mandatory provisions of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are now
advisory.320 Since Booker, federal judges have enjoyed a “renewed level of
discretion” in issuing punishment.321 This discretion is important because a
central tenet of punishment is that “individual cases require individualized
responses.”322
The goals of criminal punishment—including both general and specific
deterrence, as well as retribution and rehabilitation—do not land on
individual offenders in the same way, and a healthy level of judicial
discretion accounts for this.323 Professor Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. noted as
much almost two decades before Roper: “[A]n obvious example is the age
of the offender. Because youths are ‘less mature and responsible than adults,’
and hence less culpable for criminal conduct, retribution is a less defensible
punishment objective than is rehabilitation with regard to youthful
offenders.”324 Judicial discretion in sentencing ensures that judges give the
317. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 77 (2010) (opining that “perhaps no . . . judicial
responsibilities are more difficult than sentencing” because it requires trial judges to “seek
with diligence and professionalism to take account of the human existence of the offender and
the just demands of a wronged society”); see also Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 481
(2000) (“We have often noted that judges in this country have long exercised discretion . . . in
imposing sentence[s] within statutory limits in the individual case.”); Williams v. New York,
337 U.S. 241, 246 (1949) (acknowledging that “both before and since the American colonies
became a nation, courts . . . practiced a policy under which a sentencing judge could
exercise . . . wide discretion . . . in determining the kind and extent of punishment to be
imposed”).
318. Scott, supra note 287, at 201; see also Alan Dubois & Anne E. Blanchard, Sentencing
Due Process: How Courts Can Use Their Discretion to Make Sentencings More Accurate
and Trustworthy, 18 FED. SENT’G REP. 84, 84 (2005) (arguing that “sentencing has become by
far the most important stage of the criminal process for most defendants,” and that “as the
stakes at sentencing have increased,” so too has the need for “more rigorous sentencing
procedures”).
319. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
320. Id. at 246.
321. Eric G. Barber, Judicial Discretion, Sentencing Guidelines, and Lessons from
Medieval England, 1066–1215, 27 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 1, 4 (2005).
322. D. Michael Fisher, Striking a Balance: The Need to Temper Judicial Discretion
Against a Background of Legislative Interest in Federal Sentencing, 49 DUQ. L. REV. 65, 82
(2007).
323. Id. at 82–83.
324. Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., The Death of Discretion?: Reflections on the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1938, 1958 (1988); see also Roper v. Simmons, 543
U.S. 551, 553 (2005) (noting that “[o]nce juveniles’ diminished culpability is recognized,”
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personhood of the accused due attention, and that punishments fit the
crime.325
Justice Thomas’s dissent in Miller excoriated the majority for what he
perceived as a tempering of judicial discretion in the context of juvenile life
without parole sentencing.326 By leaving discretionary sentences available
but emphasizing the way in which appropriate occasions for imposing the
sentence would be “uncommon,” the majority, at least in Justice Thomas’s
view, was prophylactically restricting trial judges’ discretion to impose it.327
At the same time, the Court has frequently stated that judicial discretion
should be limited in the context of sentencing children. During oral argument
in Miller, Bryan Stevenson, counsel for petitioners, reminded the Court of its
reasoning in Graham: because even experts struggle to say whether longterm projections of rehabilitation are possible, the imposition of a
discretionary juvenile life without parole sentence for a nonhomicide offense
is categorically invalid.328 Indeed, in Graham, the majority indicated a level
of skepticism about a judge’s ability to determine, on a case-by-case basis,
which offenders were incorrigible and which were not.329 Thus, Graham
represents an acceptable limit on judicial discretion.330 This limit is not
borne out of any doubt about a judge’s ability to exercise discretion, but
rather from the impossibility of making such a determination and the stakes
of potential mistakes.331
Jones represents a departure from the reasoning in Graham. For the
majority, whether a judge possesses and exercises their discretion to sentence
a child to life without parole is both the beginning and end of the inquiry.332
According to Justice Kavanaugh, such a holding was appropriate considering
the Court’s precedent.333 Under the majority’s interpretation, Miller and
Montgomery do not require a specific finding of incorrigibility.334 The
neither the penological goal of retribution nor deterrence “provides adequate justification for
imposing [certain penalties like capital punishment] on juveniles”).
325. Ogletree, supra note 324, at 1954 (remarking that a sentencing scheme that “ignores
every personal characteristic of the offender” is likely to lead to “gross miscarriages of justice
in individual cases”).
326. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 509 (2012) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
327. See id.
328. Transcript of Oral Argument at 21, Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012)
(No.
10-9646),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2011/10-9646
[https://perma.cc/DHZ9-27SV] (click “View”).
329. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 77–78 (2010).
330. See id. at 79.
331. See id. (noting that a sentence of life without parole imposed on a child “gives no
chance for fulfillment outside prison walls, no chance for reconciliation with society, [and] no
hope”).
332. Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307, 1313 (2021) (“[A] State’s discretionary
sentencing system is both constitutionally necessary and constitutionally sufficient.”).
333. See id. at 1321.
334. See id. at 1317 (rejecting the argument that permanent incorrigibility is an eligibility
criterion for juvenile life without parole and noting that Montgomery “explicitly stated that ‘a
finding of fact regarding a child’s incorrigibility . . . is not required’” (alteration in original)
(quoting Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 211 (2016))); id. at 1318 (opining that if
the Miller or Montgomery Courts “wanted to require sentencers to also make a factual finding
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majority endorsed the view that if a sentencing court has discretion to
consider youth, the court “necessarily will” consider youth.335 This
determination assumes that the existence of discretion is equivalent to the
judicious exercise of discretion.336 To illustrate by way of a hypothetical,
the Jones majority would not have a problem with two judges considering
the same defendant’s youth differently and arriving at different sentences.337
All that matters is that each judge had the discretion in the first place.338
Critics of Jones were quick to condemn the decision.339 The primary point
of contention from the dissenters in Jones was that the decision distorted
precedent and left a black box of judicial discretion where the permanent
incorrigibility principle used to be.340 However, Kristina Kersey, senior
youth defense counsel at the National Juvenile Defender Center, is one critic
of Jones who has shown that advocates may find room within the decision to
continue protecting the rights of child defendants.341 For instance, Kersey
characterizes the permanent incorrigibility principle as a “red herring” in the
Court’s jurisprudence that should no longer guide courts in their
decision-making.342 Kersey also encourages advocates and defense counsel
to take advantage of broad judicial discretion to fashion creative arguments
to present to courts.343 Finally, Kersey recognizes that the Jones decision
gives states the option to provide additional limits on the sentence.344 Part
III provides three solutions to the issues created and exacerbated by Jones.
III. CHARTING A PATH FORWARD IN THE WAKE OF JONES
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in the realm of juvenile life without
parole sentencing is a Gordian knot. It is true that the Court’s decisions since
Roper significantly protect children who commit crimes and enter adult
criminal courts as a result.345 Over the span of about a decade, the Supreme
Court took steps to protect children from the harshest punishments that the
of permanent incorrigibility, the Court easily could have said so”); id. (noting that in Miller,
the Court stated that a discretionary sentencing procedure “would itself help make
life-without-parole sentences ‘relatively rar[e]’” (alteration in original) (quoting Miller v.
Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 483–84 n.10 (2012)); id. at 1320 (emphasizing that “Miller did not
say a word about requiring some kind of particular sentencing explanation with an implicit
finding of permanent incorrigibility, as Montgomery later confirmed”).
335. See id. at 1319.
336. See id. (rejecting the argument that “meaningful daylight” exists between a judge’s
discretion to consider youth and a judge’s actual consideration of youth).
337. See id.
338. See id. at 1319–20.
339. See supra notes 33, 35, 38, and accompanying text.
340. See Jones, 141 S. Ct. at 1328 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court’s
decision “guts” Miller and Montgomery by removing the permanent incorrigibility principle).
341. KRISTINA KERSEY, NAT’L JUV. DEF. CTR., KEEPING UP WITH THE JONESES: 10 THINGS
I KINDA MAYBE DON’T HATE ABOUT JONES (2021), https://njdc.info/wp-content/
uploads/Keeping-up-with-the-Joneses-7-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/KGV2-H6QD].
342. See id.; see also Pfaff, supra note 38.
343. See KERSEY, supra note 341.
344. See id.
345. See supra Part I.C.
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criminal justice system metes out—including the death penalty.346 Miller
guaranteed that no jurisdiction can enact a mandatory sentencing scheme that
automatically sentences children to life without parole.347 And as a result of
Montgomery, hundreds of juvenile lifers, including Montgomery himself,
can obtain parole and a second chance at freedom.348 At the same time, the
justices began toying with the concept of incorrigibility early on—setting off
a frenzy of lower court opinions that treated incorrigibility as the standard.349
Jones threw a wrench in this practice by expressly rejecting the notion that
judges must make explicit or implicit findings of incorrigibility.350 The
problem Jones does not solve is how courts can meaningfully and
consistently determine when a sentence of juvenile life without parole is
appropriate.351
Considering this doctrinal predicament, this part sets forth potential
options to untangle the knot. Specifically, it proposes both an idealistic,
long-term solution and two modest practical suggestions in the interim. First,
Part III.A argues that the Court’s precedent supports a categorical bar to the
imposition of juvenile life without parole sentences that would provide the
most complete resolution of the problem. Part III.A envisions what it would
look like if the Court were to revisit Miller and adopt a constitutional
prohibition on the sentence. However, given the reality of the current Court’s
political makeup,352 Part III.B proposes that (1) individual state courts should
treat Jones as a constitutional floor and nevertheless engage in a searching
review of what youth means in a particular context; and (2) courts should
also focus on meaningful opportunities for release, because the permanent
incorrigibility principle has proven to be a less than tidy inquiry.
A. Categorically Capable of Rehabilitation: Revisiting Miller to Address
the Permanent Incorrigibility Problem
This section addresses the issue set forth in Part II by arguing that the
remedy to the problem that the permanent incorrigibility principle has
wrought is to revisit Miller. This section argues that previous decisions in
the youth sentencing context provide precedential building blocks for a
categorical bar to life without parole sentences for children under eighteen.
A categorical ban would not only comport with the Court’s precedent, but it

346. See supra Part I.C.
347. See supra Part I.C.
348. See supra Part I.C.
349. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
350. See supra Part I.C.
351. See supra Part II.B.
352. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Opinion, The Supreme Court Is Now 6–3. What Does
That Mean?, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/05/
opinion/supreme-court-amy-coney-barrett.html [https://perma.cc/C8Q4-RTED]; Ariane de
Vogue, Major 6–3 Rulings Foreshadow a Sharper Supreme Court Right Turn, CNN (July 1,
2021, 6:26 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2021/07/01/politics/supreme-court-6-3-conservativeliberal/index.html [https://perma.cc/2DPX-62YT]. The six conservative justices made up the
majority in Jones, with Justices Stephen G. Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan dissenting.
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would also shut the door on the problematic permanent incorrigibility
principle.
Miller is an outlier in the Supreme Court’s youth sentencing jurisprudence
because it stopped short of a categorical ban where other decisions did not.353
Roper issued a categorical ban on the death penalty for children354 and
Graham did the same for life without parole in nonhomicide cases.355 In
Roper and Graham, the Court applied its evolving-standards-of-decency
analysis to conclude that each punishment was categorically
unconstitutional.356 By contrast, the Miller Court specifically rejected the
opportunity to issue a categorical ban.357 There are two specific missteps in
the Court’s decision in Miller.
First, Miller differs from its predecessors in terms of how the Court framed
its precedent. Writing for the majority, Justice Kagan noted that the
questions in Miller implicated the strand of the Court’s precedent concerning
categorical bans on disproportionate punishment.358 However, Justice
Kagan also found that Miller triggered a second set of cases requiring
individualized consideration in the capital sentencing context.359 By pairing
the two sets of cases, the Court effectively avoided fitting Miller into the
former group involving categorical bans.360 Instead, the Court’s approach in
Miller melds together two lines of the Court’s jurisprudence.361
The Court’s reliance on two strands of precedent in Miller also hinges on
the assumption that the permanent incorrigibility principle is sound.
Although the Court’s precedent in the second line of jurisprudence requires
sentencing judges to be able to consider the mitigating qualities of youth, the
cases discussed in Part II.A.2 illustrate that such consideration of youth often
becomes an analysis of whether a particular defendant is capable of
rehabilitation.362 Furthermore, if the Court did not implicitly endorse the
permanent incorrigibility principle in Miller, it could have issued a
categorical ban. Instead, the Court expressly stated that its decision did not
foreclose a court’s ability to make a judgment of permanent incorrigibility.363
By leaving that possibility open, the Court indicated that because some
children could be found to be permanently incapable of rehabilitation, such
a categorical ban would not be appropriate.364
While the Court reasoned that its holding—which barred mandatory
sentences of life without parole—was sufficient, this Note disagrees. The
353. See supra Part I.C.
354. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578–79 (2005).
355. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010).
356. Roper, 543 U.S. at 552.
357. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012).
358. Id. at 470.
359. Id.
360. See id. (noting that the “confluence” of these two lines of cases formed the basis of
the Court’s narrow ruling).
361. See id.
362. See supra Part II.A.2.
363. Miller, 567 U.S. at 480.
364. See id. at 483.
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Court in Miller misstepped first by couching the issue in an amalgamation of
two strands of precedent when it could have built on Roper and Graham to
issue a categorical ban on the logic that children are, as a class, less culpable
than adults. Second, the Court also erred when it hedged on the permanent
incorrigibility principle: in the same paragraph of the opinion, the Court
acknowledged how difficult such a principle would be, while also saying that
it did not foreclose this determination.
Even though this Note argues that Miller is a flawed opinion for those two
reasons, there is enough precedential material in the opinion for the Court to
issue a categorical ban in the future. A categorical bar on juvenile life
without parole sentences is the best resolution of the issue because it would
end the permanent incorrigibility conversation in a way that Jones did not:
by protecting defendants under eighteen.365 The central flaw in Miller’s
reasoning is that it assumes the ability of a sentencing judge to consider the
mitigating qualities of youth and to make a prediction about a particular
young offender’s capacity for reform and change.366 Jones further
exacerbates the problem by expressly holding that no factual finding, either
explicit or implicit, is required to levy the harsh punishment of juvenile life
without parole.367 This logic is defective for two reasons: permanent
incorrigibility is an impossible predictive exercise,368 and the lack of any
procedural requirements creates room for unfettered discretion.369
The Court’s Eighth Amendment evolving-standards-of-decency analysis
supports a categorical ban as well.370 Under the first step, which requires the
Court to assess “objective indicia” of consensus against juvenile life without
parole, there is strong evidence of consensus against the sentence.371 For
instance, thirty-one states and the District of Columbia do not have any
individuals serving juvenile life without parole sentences.372 Furthermore,
the Court has sometimes turned to international opinion concerning the
continuing acceptability of a particular form of punishment or sentence.373
On that front, there is clear international consensus against juvenile life
without parole. There are no known cases of juvenile life without parole
sentences being imposed outside the United States.374 Furthermore, the
United Nations General Assembly consistently calls for the abrogation of

365. See supra Parts I.C, II.B.
366. Marshall, supra note 38, at 1635.
367. See supra Part I.C.
368. See supra Part II.A.1; see also Marshall, supra note 38, at 1641.
369. See supra Part II.A.
370. See supra Part I.C.
371. See supra Part I.A; see also supra note 201.
372. Rovner, supra note 40.
373. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 80 (2010) (noting that the Court’s examination
of international consensus and practices is “a longstanding practice”).
374. COLUM. L. SCH. HUM. RTS. INST., CHALLENGING JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE:
HOW HAS HUMAN RIGHTS MADE A DIFFERENCE? (2014), https://web.law.columbia.edu/
sites/default/files/microsites/human-rights-institute/files/jwlop_case_study_final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z7K4-XDK4].

1068

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91

juvenile life without parole sentences.375 Thus, under the first step of the
Court’s evolving-standards-of-decency analysis, there is strong evidence of
domestic and international consensus against juvenile life without parole
sentences.
As for the Court’s independent judgment, the groundwork in Roper and
Graham provides a strong foundation for the Supreme Court to emphasize
that children are different from adults and thus should never be subject to life
in prison without the possibility of release.376 And the Court stated in
Graham that the principle of incorrigibility is not consistent with youth.377
Such a move by the Court is ultimately unlikely, however, given the current
composition of its membership.378 Since Miller was decided, Justices
Anthony Kennedy and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, who both joined the tightly split
5–4 majority opinion in Miller, are no longer on the bench.379 Justice
Kennedy in particular wrote the majority opinions in Roper,380 Graham,381
and Montgomery.382 His absence will likely make a majority vote favoring
a categorical ban nearly impossible to attain.383
There is an argument that Jones is constitutionally sufficient because it
gives courts discretion to impose less than life without parole. However,
given all that the Court has said about how children are constitutionally
different for the purposes of sentencing, there is a better argument that Jones
fails to faithfully adhere to established precedent that the Court has
established, and that there is room to remedy the effect of Jones and Miller
by issuing a categorical ban. Given the unlikelihood of a categorical ban in
the near term, the next section sets forth two modest, incremental changes
that will help resolve the tension created after Jones.
B. Focusing on Jones as a Floor and Meaningful Opportunities for Release
If the Court does not revisit Miller and issue a categorical ban on juvenile
life without parole sentences, then an alternative approach to alleviating the
foreseeable discrepancies among lower courts after Jones lies with the states.
This section proposes two mechanisms by which state courts, legislatures,
and parole boards can continue to protect the Eighth Amendment rights of
children who are convicted of crimes.
1. Jones as a Floor
Absent a ruling from the Supreme Court or federal legislation banning the
sentence, more states should follow the lead of the state courts discussed in
375.
376.
377.
378.
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.

See id.
See supra Part I.C.
Graham, 560 U.S. at 73.
See Marshall, supra note 38, at 1668.
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 463 (2012).
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 554 (2005).
560 U.S. at 51.
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 192 (2016).
See Marshall, supra note 38, at 1669.
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Part II.A.1. Indeed, Jones itself suggests as much: Justice Kavanaugh closed
his opinion by recommending that Jones and other incarcerated individuals
present their arguments to “state officials authorized to act on them.”384
Because the Court has passed this issue to the states, state courts should
respond by offering greater protection than Jones does to children who are
potentially subject to juvenile life without parole sentences. In so doing, state
courts could abolish the sentence on a de facto basis, either by instituting a
stringent permanent incorrigibility standard test that no one can pass or by
emulating the holdings in Sweet and Diatchenko by issuing a categorical ban.
In choosing to go beyond Jones, state courts would adhere to the traditional
view that individual judges must retain discretion during the sentencing
process.385 In fact, judges who conduct a more stringent analysis of
mitigating evidence than Jones requires would protect the legitimacy of
judicial decision-making at the sentencing stage.386 Both commentators and
the Court have emphasized the importance and gravity of judicial discretion
at sentencing.387 Jones’s assumption that a judge will necessarily exercise
their discretion if it exists is not a satisfactory answer, given the gravity of
the rights at stake. Instead, judges who meticulously review mitigating
evidence will do more to uphold what Justice Kennedy in Graham described
as the most difficult judicial task.388
Furthermore, a state high court’s abolition of juvenile life without parole
would not encroach on judicial discretion, either. This is because permanent
incorrigibility findings are impossible.389 For the same reason, neither would
abolition be driven by a distrust or skepticism of the judiciary’s ability to
mete out fair and consistent punishment. The problem is inherent in the
permanent incorrigibility inquiry itself. Thus, encouraging state courts to go
beyond Jones will not offend the notion of judicial discretion. The next
section introduces and builds on the scholarship of Professor Alexandra
Harrington to propose a method by which courts can protect the rights of
children at various points throughout the sentencing process.
2. Meaningful Opportunities for Release
Professor Harrington argues that because the Court has endorsed parole as
a way to remedy the constitutional violations posed by mandatory life
without parole sentences, one way to comport with the Court’s promises
would be to reform the mechanisms behind parole board review.390 First,
Professor Harrington proposes a presumption of release for people who were
children at the time of the crime.391 Second, Professor Harrington suggests
384. Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307, 1323 (2021).
385. See supra Part II.C.
386. See supra note 317 and accompanying text.
387. See supra Part II.C.
388. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 77 (2010).
389. See Marshall, supra note 38.
390. Alexandra Harrington, The Constitutionalization of Parole: Fulfilling the Promise of
Meaningful Review, 106 CORNELL L. REV. 1173, 1173 (2021).
391. Id. at 1178–79.
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that courts should conduct an independent judicial review of parole board
decisions to determine whether evidence supports overcoming the
presumption.392 Professor Harrington’s suggestions focus on the Court’s
guarantee in Montgomery of meaningful opportunities for release.393
According to Professor Harrington’s argument, the Supreme Court’s line of
youth sentencing cases “transform [parole] from a discretionary, subjective
determination [to] . . . a substantive, Eighth Amendment right.”394
Professor Harrington’s suggested presumptions and reforms would benefit
individuals currently serving life without parole sentences imposed when
they were children.395 To build on Professor Harrington’s proposals, states
should implement a multi-pronged approach that institutes a series of
presumptions from sentencing to parole review.
This multi-pronged approach would increase protections by creating
strong presumptions against continued imprisonment at multiple points
throughout an individual’s sentencing and incarceration. The first prong
would adopt the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s presumption against the
imposition of a juvenile life without parole sentence in the first place, as
established by Batts.396 To overcome the presumption, the prosecution
would have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a child defendant is
permanently incorrigible.397
If the prosecution overcomes the presumption, then the second and third
prongs, as devised by Professor Harrington, would provide protection
throughout incarceration. Professor Harrington’s first proposal is that there
be a presumption in favor of release during parole board review.398 This
presumption would have to be overcome by clear and convincing evidence
that release should not be granted.399 Professor Harrington’s proposal that
the evidence of rehabilitation be current also impliedly rejects the permanent
incorrigibility principle by adopting something closer to a “wait-and-see”
approach to examining prospects for rehabilitation.400
If the state again overcomes the presumption in favor of release, then the
third and final protective prong would be Professor Harrington’s suggestion
that courts conduct independent judicial review of parole board decisions.401
Although there are valid arguments against giving the judiciary the power to
review parole board decisions, Professor Harrington argues that the Supreme
Court’s youth sentencing jurisprudence “provide[s] reason to question this
traditional understanding of parole” and the judiciary’s role in reviewing

392. Id.
393. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2010).
394. Harrington, supra note 390, at 1179.
395. See id. at 1175.
396. See Commonwealth v. Batts, 163 A.3d 410 (Pa. 2017); supra Part II.A.1.
397. See Batts, 163 A.3d at 460.
398. Harrington, supra note 390, at 1178–79.
399. Id. at 1212.
400. See id. at 1213 (emphasizing that “the requirement to overcome the presumption of
release should be focused on current evidence of the parole applicant’s lack of rehabilitation”).
401. Id. at 1178–79.
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parole decisions.402 Thus, because of the unique interest of individuals who
were sentenced as children in being released, judicial review would be
appropriate as a final backstop.403
The above multi-pronged approach would protect children from being
sentenced to die in prison, even if a categorical ban never materializes.
Instituting a presumption against the sentence itself, in addition to a
presumption in favor of release, would guarantee that judges, parole boards,
and other authorities continue to meaningfully consider whether a child is
deserving of a life in prison.
CONCLUSION
Over the past decade, the Supreme Court has issued a series of decisions
that chip away at the harsh sentences imposed on children who commit
crimes. The Court relied on contemporary neuroscientific and commonsense
understandings of the line between childhood and adulthood to support its
conclusions. However, the Court also opened the door to the idea of
permanent incorrigibility: the notion that a “rare juvenile” who is
permanently corrupt and therefore deserving of adult punishment can exist.
The introduction of that term, which is peppered throughout the Court’s
jurisprudence, set off a split among lower courts that Jones attempted to
resolve.
Jones negated the assumption that many lower courts had been making—
that for a child to receive life without parole, a court would have to find that
they are permanently incorrigible. To comply with Jones, a court need not
make any factual findings or statements on the record before imposing the
harshest sentence available to those under eighteen. In the wake of Jones,
courts will likely struggle with balancing trust in judicial decision-making
against protecting the Eighth Amendment rights of children.
To settle these impending conflicts, a categorical ban established by the
Supreme Court is necessary. However, given the composition of today’s
Court, smaller, more modest changes can also be implemented to protect
children both at sentencing and while they are incarcerated. Jones affords
judges the discretion to sentence children to life in prison without the
possibility of release. Now, it is incumbent on states to take their own steps
to protect children, under the Eighth Amendment, from the harshest
punishment available to them.

402. Id. at 1199.
403. See id. at 1204.

